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The article deals with certain political and economic consequences of recent American war
involvements. It is found that the nation’s economy experienced particularly pronounced
surges of growth during wartime and certain implications of this fact for both Keynesian and
Marxian doctrine are discussed. It is further demonstrated that, contrary to much conven-
tional wisdom, labor rather than business derived the greatest gains from U.S. military
interventions abroad - a finding which, while perhaps counterintuitive, can be explained by
the joint exigencies of politics and economics in wartime. Finally, while economic con-
siderations may not have influenced the decisions to initiate foreign intervention, it is sug-
gested that they may well have affected the subsequent expansion and duration of military
involvement.
War has traditionally been an issue which
has claimed much of the attention of polit-
ical scientists concerned with international
affairs. The lion’s share of their efforts has
however been devoted to the study of its
causes rather than its effects. A considerable
amount of attention has, for example, fo-
cused on the empirical correlates of war with
the purpose of discerning the pattern of cir-
cumstances surrounding its occurrrence.1
There have also been efforts at formulating
and testing complex causal models of the
process leading to the onset of inter-state
hostilities.2 The issue of the consequences of
international conflict has, on the other hand,
been somewhat neglected within the disci-
pline. This is not the natural sequence which
investigations in the social sciences should
be expected to follow. Rather, an under-
standing of the difference which some social
phenomenon makes would seem naturally
antecedent to any investment into the study
of its causes. The preferential focus on causes
rather than consequences is nonetheless
understandable - after all, the fact that
war produces, as its principal effect, the
destruction of life and property seems ob-
vious and requires no elaborate demonstra-
tion. Yet, as we probe deeper and as we
broaden the scope of our concerns, it be-
comes harder to feel confident about the
adequacy of our knowledge. What, for ex-
ample, is the immediate effect of inter-
national conflict on national political in-
stitutions ? What are the long term effects of
war on societal development? Who, if any-
one, benefits from wars? Although such
matters have occasionally been addressed,3 3
the range of questions to which we have no
adequate and tested answers is surprisingly
vast and this fact alone should justify addi-
tional efforts in this area.
The aim of this brief study will be to
assess some effects of recent U.S. war in-
volvements on the country’s economic
growth and, more specifically, on the dis-
tribution of national income between major
social groups. Certain directly political
implications of these consequences will also
be discussed. Throughout, the study will fo-
cus on the basic structure of the relevant
processes and will aim for presentational
clarity. The utility of such an inquiry should
not be very hard to justify. Since war is the
most dramatic, costly, and apparently aber-
rant form of interaction between states and
since, furthermore, the pursuit of material
growth and of some conception of distribu-
tional equity is one of the most permanent
and accepted aims of political activity
within nations, it should be of considerable
interest to attempt to relate the two. An-
other, and just as important payoff of such
a study might be to shed some new light on
the pattern of domestic inducements and
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constraints on American participation in
foreign wars (thus linking the matter of
cause with that of consequence).
Before proceeding too far, a number of
caveats are in order. The United States is,
from an economic point of view, hardly a
representative nation. Nor has U.S. pa.rticipa-
tion in the three wars considered here
(World War II, Korea, and Vietnam) neces-
sarily been representative of most involve-
ments in war. None of the wars called for a
total commitment of the country’s resources
nor did they cause any direct destruction of
the American homeland (as would have
resulted from fighting on the national ter-
ritory or in, say, bombardment). While it
might thus be perilous to generalize very far,
the effect of U.S. participation in armed con-
flict is of obvious importance in and of itself.
Furthermore, certain conclusions reached on
this empirical basis might apply to future
American experience should the country
again be involved in extended military inter-
vention abroad.
War and U.S. economic growth
The major purpose of economic activity is
to augment material wealth. While this has
long been considered the responsibility of
essentially private actors, political author-
ities are increasingly being held accountable
by their publics for providing the conditions
of prosperity at the national level. Economic
activity has become more and more polit-
icized and, accordingly, a growing number
of political scientists are delving into the
political context and ramifications of eco-
nomic performance.4
Intuitively, it may seem apparent that war
(even of a limited nature) must have detri-
mental effects on a nation’s economy. Capi-
tal is, after all, diverted from its normal
uses, private consumption is usually cur-
tailed, price mechanisms are often suspended
in market economies, and so forth. Intuitive
impressions notwithstanding, there are
strong empirical and theoretical reasons for
thinking otherwise. While some of the
relevant theory will be described in this sec-
tion, it might be useful to begin by examin-
ing the actual data,
Fig. 1.
U.S. Economic Growth: 1933 - 1977
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Figure 1 displays the trajectory of the
Gross National Product of the United States
(expressed in constant 1972 dollars) since the
introduction of New Deal economics in
1933 or, in other words, since the begin-
nings of contemporary economic policy in
this country. A visual inspection of the time
series does suggest a surge in national in-
come during wartime and relative to the pre-
ceding period, a surge which was particularly
pronounced during the first two wars but
which is discernible in the Vietnam case
as well. In concrete numerical terms, the
average yearly wartime increase in constant
GNP was 37.8 billion dollars; during periods
of peace an average of only 16.6 billion dol-
lars was added to GNP yearly. War, in other
words, was associated with absolute in-
creases in national wealth which were con-
siderably higher than those which obtained
in peacetime. At a lower level of aggrega-
tion, Table I compares these same average
yearly increases during each of the three
wars with the comparable figure for the
same number of previous years.
Table I. Average Yearly Change in Gross National
Product*.
* GNP data (expressed in constant 1972 dollars)
are from The Economic Report of the President
1978 (Washington, DC).
The difference is obviously rather large;
while it is greatest in the case of the Korean
War (reflecting the very poor performance
of the economy during the preceding period),
the difference is substantial as far as the
other two wars go as well. It is also worth
noting that the pre-World War II period
taken here does not include the most critical
years of the Great Depression (in fact, I
begin the series in 1933 rather than 1929,
when the needed data are already available,
in order to avoid the bias which might other-
wise have been introduced).
From another angle, table II presents com-
parisons (1933-1977) between wartime and
peacetime values for average changes in con-
stant GNP (AGNP) as well as for three other
indicators of economic performance: average
yearly change in personal income in billions
of constant dollars (~y), average yearly rate
of unemployment (°/o u), and average yearly
increase in the Industrial Production Index
(AIPI). A simple (and not unreasonably
demanding in terms of its prior assumptinos)
non-parametric U statistic is also presented;
its value provides a measure of the signif-
icance of the discrepancy between the war-
time and peacetime distributions of the
values of each of the four variables.
Again, there is a clear difference between
the performance of these measures in war
and in peace. Personal income and industrial
Table II. Indicators of Economic Performance.*
- . -
* Data for 3GNP, AY and u % are taken from:
The Economic Report of the President for 1969
and 1978. The data for 3IPI are from: The Hand-
book of Basic Economic Statistics - Iuly 1978
(Bureau of Economic Statistics Inc. ) .
production (as measured by the index) have
both tended to increase considerably during
wartime; unemployment has been less than
half its peacetime magnitude. The level of
significance for these differences is very re-
spectable in terms of most conventionally
accepted levels.
Thus far, the conclusion seems inescapable:
war has been associated with periods of ex-
ceptionally rapid growth across some im-
portant indicators of economic performance.
Whatever else they may have been, America’s
economic wars were not economically neu-
tral. Nevertheless, this statement should not
be endowed with excessive meaning. Quite
apart from the associated human losses,
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growth in such a context has not necessarily
involved a qualitative improvement in Amer-
ican economic life. To begin with, wartime
income growth does not invariably go hand
in hand with a corresponding movement in
disposable personal income, as this will de-
pend on the method by which the war is
financed. If this is done through taxation,
fiscal claims on personal income may neu-
tralize the effect of overall increases. If, on
the other hand, the government relies on
deficit spending, then the differences between
movements in the two quantities may be
slight. Secondly, the nature of the increased
economic activity means that the quantity
and quality of available civilian goods and
services will probably not improve (although
income gains could, in principle, be used for
purchases from abroad). Finally, none of
the economic gains would be anticipated in
anything but a limited war (which involves
no destruction of the economic infrastruc-
ture and capital stock).
What the evidence does imply is that addi-
tional claims were placed on the nation’s
productive capacity, that available economic
resources were used more intensely and that
eventually, expanded productive capacity
was established in response to increased
needs.
This, however, is simply an empirical
statement, it tells us what happened but
does not enlighten us as to the nature of the
link between war and economics. Although
no definitive answers can be given, there are
theoretical arguments, based on both
Marxian and Keynesian doctrine, which sug-
gest that secular stagnation may have been
the rule in the absence of occasional warfare.
While the reader may be familiar with these
arguments, a brief recapitulation should be
useful.
Contemporary Marxian authors do not
always constitute a uniform school, yet
many of their misgivings concerning the
viability of capitalist economies focus on
the creation of an ultimately unabsorbable
economic surplus. One of the most influen-
tial treatments of this issue is certainly that
provided by Baran and Sweezy in their book
entitled Monopol Capital.s The authors
define such a surplus as ’the difference be-
tween what a society produces and the costs
of producing it’6 and state that, as capitalist
economies move from a competitive to an
oligopolistic market structure, this surplus
will inevitably increase as a proportion of
total output. This, in turn, must lead to
inventory accumulation and sluggish or
negative growth. Barring periods of ’epoch-
making innovations’ (such as, say, the
automobile) growth can be salvaged only by
the absorptive effects of war and militarism.
This seems, with minor variations, to be the
gist of the relevant portions of much Marxian
theory in the United States and, in the
medium term at least, war is viewed as a
palliative (though not a long term cure) to
economic stagnation.
Keynesians, as is well known, rejected the
classical notions of the automatic adjust-
ment of both employment (via wages) and
investment (via interest rates) to levels con-
sistent with health economic activity. Rather,
due to the inability of savings to translate
automatically into comparable levels of in-
vestment, private aggregate demand (the sum
of personal consumption and business in-
vestment) would fall short of the economy’s
productive capacity - leading to recession
or depression. Government spending should,
therefore, supplement private demand to
effectuate the necessary adjustment. As war-
time spending can perform this function on
a very large scale, the Keynesian diagnosis
can also be said to support the contention
that war can occasionally play an econom-
ically useful role. There is, admittedly, noth-
ing in the Keynesian model which implies
that other forms of spending may not play
the same role with respect to aggregate
demand. The issue would, at this point,
presumably turn on the extent to which
other forms of public spending are effec-
tively available. This is no longer an eco-
nomic but a political question and an argu-
ment might be made that, in the American
context, the amount of civilian governmental
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expenditure which would have been needed
to fuel economic growth may have been
more than would have been ideologically
acceptable.7
There are thus theoretical grounds for
considering limited military engagements as
occasionally useful, if perhaps not essential,
remedies for stagnationist impulses.8 It is not
the purpose of this article to provide an ex-
haustive evaluation of these arguments; it is,
however, useful to indicate the extant
theoretical structures which may help us
evaluate the economic implications of war-
fare. In addition to drawing our attention to
such theories, the modest quantitative
exercise contained in this section serves sev-
eral other purposes.
In the first place, and despite the fact
that our major concern here is with wartime
effects, the data remind us that the eco-
nomic gains occasioned by limited warfare
have not been reversed upon the termination
of hostilities. While this is visually depicted
for AGNP in Figure I, it is generally true for
other indicators of aggregate economic per-
formance as well. Growth rates typically
do slow down subsequently (and are occa-
sionally even negative) but there does not
seem to have been a return to pre-war levels
of economic activity. That the newly devel-
oped productive capacity (which is usually
developed after the height of the conflict)
can be matched by post-war aggregate de-
mand is probably due to three factors. To
begin with wartime consumption is usually
curtailed creating a situation of pent up con-
sumer demand - with peace, it is suddenly
released fueling growth through private
demand. Further with the exception of the
Vietnam war, military spending displayed a
’ratchet effect’ by remaining at a level far in
excess of pre-war norms, thus perpetuating
some of the conflict’s economic effects.
Finally, wars have typically served the pur-
pose of legitimizing higher levels of welfare-
related expenditure as the least privileged
segments of society were usually called upon
to bear the brunt of the human losses; thus
even as military spending decreased, public
spending for civilian purposes was in a
position to maintain adequate levels of ag-
gregate demand.
Secondly, in addition to extending our in-
sights beyond the actual duration of the wars,
the data highlight the absolute magnitudes of
the changes in the economy which can be
associated with the actual hostilities. There is
even some evidence that these magnitudes
came as a surprise to those most closely
associated with the functioning of the eco-
nomic system. Arthur Okun, President Ken-
nedy’s principal economic adviser, recalls
that with the onset of full scale U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam:
Economic activity zoomed from mid 1965 into
early 1966 ... In the fourth quarter G.N.P. rose by
the largest amount in history. Unemployment fell
to 4.0 percent of the labor force by year end. This
leap exceeded anyone’s expectations or desires.9
And, furthermore:
In the view of the American businessman, the
initial increments to the defense budget virtually
eliminated any danger of recession or sluggish
growth in 1966. A high floor was established under
the economy and the downslide risks essentially
disappeared.10
In the third place, and this is obviously
most relevant to our present concerns, the
detection of substantial increases which are
associated with warfare naturally leads to
the important question of how these gains
are distributed. An answer to this question
might shed some additional light on the
nature of the socio-economic system and
perhaps hasten our understanding of the rel-
ative interest which foreign military involve-
ment can present for some major scoial
groups.
Who gains from war?
There are a number of approaches to the
question of how gains from war-induced
growth are apportioned by the socio-eco-
nomic system, and the choice of any par-
ticular approach should be guided by con-
ceptual and substantive concerns. One might,
for example, focus on the distribution of
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gains between different regions (e. g., be-
tween the West Coast and the Northeast),
or one might attempt to assess the relative
gains acquired by different branches of eco-
nomic activity (e. g., the aerospace industry
versus the construction industry), one might,
furthermore, focus on the differential im-
pact of war on various social strata, and so
forth. In short, there are virtually as many
ways of slicing into the matter as there are
manners of categorizing the components of a
society. Further complicating the issue is the
fact that short term gains (or losses) may
well be reversed in the longer run - hence
an explicit time frame is needed as well.
For purposes of this study, the focus will
be on the economic gains, defined as growth
in respective shares of national income, ac-
cruing to capital and to labor in the period
of the war’s actual duration. There are two
reasons for this choice. Capital and labor
are, first of all, two major factors of produc-
tion ; accordingly, payments to capital (pro-
fits) and compensation of employees (wages)
have together represented roughly 80 percent
of U.S. national income during most of the
period considered here. If income growth
accelerates in wartime, it should then be
interesting to discover how the accretions to
national wealth are distributed between its
two major p;roducers. Another reason for
the emphasis on capital and labor derives
from the simple fact that the issue of their
relative position has been at the heart of
some of the most important debates in
political theory and political economy dur-
ing the past century, a debate which is per-
petuating itself as labor ceases to be defined
in narrow ’blue collar’ terms.ll While the
controversies have often pitted ideological
left against ideological right, a fair amount
of divergence has existed within doctrinal
groupings as well.
Despite certain fleeting allusions in the
literature to war’s effect on social equality in
general, the issue has not been placed in the
specific context of the relative position of
capital owners and wage earners. In attempt-
ing to acquire a first grip on the problem, it
is therefore necessary to proceed in a slightly
round-about manner. The comparison of
economic growth rates in war and in peace
yielded the conclusion that, during recent
American history, war has been associated
with visible ecenomic surges. If one is willing
to entertain the possibility of a causal link, it
may be useful to approach the matter by
relying on that body of literature which deals
with the question of how the fruits of up-
swings in economic cycles in general are ap-
portioned between profits and wages.
Perhaps the best known position in this
regard is that of Marx, who asserted that
workers rather than capital owners are the
principal beneficiaries of periods of eco-
nomic boom. The explanation, of course, lies
in the fact that during periods of cyclical
upturns the ’reserve army of the uemployed’
is sufficiently reduced to strengthen labor’s
hand in its confrontations with capital, thus
enabling wage earners to obtain an increased
share of the national income. 12 While most
of Marx’s followers have naturally concurred
with this position, there have also been ex-
ceptions. Michael Kalecki, for example, has
maintained that, in a context characterized
by monopolistic pricing, businessmen can
successfully pass on increased labor costs
to consumers, thus ensuring a simultaneous
gain for both profits and wages. 13 Many
Keynesian liberals, on the other hand, have
regarded labor as the losing party during the
expansionary phase of the business cycle.
This has been based on the premise that the
inflationary pressures which typically ac-
company this phase tend to swell profit rates
while reducing the real value of nominal
wage increases.l4
A more recent perspective strikes a com-
promise of sorts between these positions.
According to Albert Burger 15 (an eco-
nomist) and Douglas Hibbsl6 (a political
scientist), relative gains will differ depend-
ing on whether the economy is at an early
or an advanced stage of the upswing. At the
beginning of a period of expansion, em-
ployers increase the utilization rate of labor
while maintaining existing levels of employ-
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Fig. 2.
Ratio of Profits to Wages: 1933 - 1977
P: Peak in business cycle.
T: Trough in business cycle.
ment - thus raising productivity and profits
(but not necessarily wages). As the ex-
pansion continues, it becomes necessary to
hire additional and often less well qualified
employees; consequently, productivity tends
to decline while the tighter labor market
enables unions to bid wages up and to
squeeze profits.
There are thus divergent perspectives on
the relative gains claimed by profits and
wages during periods of economic expansion.
In order to assess how well these theories
fare in the particular case of war-induced
growth, it will be helpful to examine the
movement over time of the ratio of profits to
wages in the national income (p/w), and to
closely observe the particular nature of this
movement in wartime. A downturn in the
ratio would signifiy that the share of wages
was increasing, an upturn would indicate a
more rapid growth of profits. The data are
presented in Figure 2 and a preliminary
visual inspection of the trajectory yields
three suggestions:
In the first place, this ratio has been ex-
periencing an evident long term decline.
Labor, in other words, appears to have been
doing even better as compared to capital.
This trend, however, has been documented
and described elsewhere and will not be
dealt with any further here
A second conclusion is that, during inter-
vals of peace, the ratio has fluctuated rather
sharply (albeit around a declining trend).
The general tendency, furthermore, has been
for upturns (favoring profits) to characterize
the early phases of an expansionary period,
and for downturns (increasing share of
wages) to occur closer to the peak and to
continue on down into the trough. In peace-
time, therefore, the positions of Burger and
Hibbs are borne out.
Finally, and this is most relevant to our
concerns, this ratio experiences substantial
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and sustained declines during periods of
active military involvement abroad. In other
words, increases in the share of wages has a
pronounced tendency to outrun changes in
the share of profits during wartime. The
principal beneficiary of war-induced growth
in America seems thus to have been the
wage-earner rather than the profit-taker
(squarely contradicting the lore of some
prevalent views).18
Another useful manner of describing this
situation is to consider that the ratio of pro-
fits to wages can experience either an in-
crease (~+) or a decrease (4-) in any given
year. One might then inquire what the odds
of one or the other occurring should be, both
in war and in peace. On the basis of the
visual analysis, the following two hypotheses
can be advanced:
(a) In wartime, the odds should favor a de-
crease rather than an increase in the
ratio.
(b) In peacetime, the odds should neither
clearly favor an increase or a decrease
since the ratio will primarily move in
conjunction with the business cycle).
A pair of 2 X 2 tables are provided in
Table II. The first (a) contains the number
of increases and decreases in war and in
peace, the second (b) displays the propor-
tions corresponding to these quantities.
Table III. The Profits to Wages Ratio in War and
Peace.
What do these figures reveal? Let us begin
with wartime and estimate the probability of
a decrease occuring during such a period.
This conditional probabilitiy is given as:
p(3~ war) = 0.27/0.38 = 0.71,
the comparable conditional probabilitiy for
an increase during wartime is, on the other
hand:
p(0+ ~ war) - 0.11/0.38 = 0.29.
Therefore, the odds that a decrease rather
than an increase will occur during wartime is:
p(3~ ] war )jp(3+ war) = 2.45.
During a period of military engagement
abroad a decrease is thus roughly two and
a half times more likely to occur in a given
year than an increase, which provides added
confirmation of war’s tendency to favor
labor over capital in the recent American
experience. How do these probabilities pre-
sent themselves in peacetime? We can repeat
the exercise as follows:
Contrary, therefore, to periods of war,
intervals of peace tend to favor profits.
Nevertheless, the odds of an increase oc-
curing are only slightly better than even,
which means that the relationship between
war and improvement in the relative position
of labor is much stronger than the relation
between peace and the gains of profits.
The conclusions are thus confirmed in
two quantitative and intuitively meaningful
fashions and, on the basis which has already
been established, we can discern the nature
of the causal process underlying these effects
of war. In the first place, involvement in
external military conflict means a reduction
in unemployment as the level of economic
activity rises to meet the new needs and,
just as significantly, by the reduction in the
supply of labor occasioned by the draft.
This reduction in supply coupled with an
increase in demand implies an exceptional
increase in the cost of labor to employers.
While the increased wage bill could theoret-
ically be offset by an increase in produc-
tivity, this typically does not occur; in fact,
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a tight labor market often means that many
marginally qualified employees must be
relied upon for a number of tasks.
More generally, the political context in
wartime simply does not encourage large
gains for business (which might lead to
charges of war profiteering). As the govern-
ment strives to control the inflation which
inevitably accompanies wars, it seems, for
example, easier and more acceptable to act
decisively on profits rather than on wages.
A tight labor market does not necessarily
imply a simultaneous shortage of capital -
the growth in labor’s bargaining power is
thus not matched by a similar increase for
business (though this would not be logically
excluded). It is, moreover, the average wage-
earner rather than the capital-owner who
bears the brunt of actual combat. The
government, for its part, must mobilize
public support for the war, and its attempts
to do so are naturally directed toward the
broad rather than the narrow segments of
this public (i. e., toward wage earners rather
Fig. 3.
Difference in % growth rates in war and peace by sector
On the basis of data from: The Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics, July 1978. Washington
D. C., Bureau of Economic Statistics Inc. Data for the first three variables were available for
the period 1939-1977, and for 1947-1977 for the last two.
than capital owners). It is in these very
terms that we can understand why excess
profits taxes were introduced during both
World War II and the Korean War (and
were implicitly threatened during the Viet-
nam involvement).
Labor has not benefited equally across all
sectors of productive activity and some
notion of the distribution of war-induced
gains should make the picture more com-
plete. Figure 3 provides information on the
difference between mean wartime and peace-
time percentage growth rates in average
weekly earnings for the following sectors:
1) durable goods, 2) nondurable goods, 3)
machinery, 4) electric goods and electronic
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machinery and, 5) transportation equip-
ment. While the categories are not always
mutually exclusive, the data indicate that
while each of the sectors has gained, in
overall terms, the durable goods sector has
tended to fare relatively best in wartime
while the difference is very slight in trans-
portation and electronics.
The empirical evidence is thus reasonably
clear and the gains of labor relative to capi-
tal can be accounted for by the joint re-
quirement of economics and politics in war-
time. The question which logically follows
on the heels of this analysis concerns the
implications of these effects for the actual
incidence and expansion of wars. Establish-
ing the apparent bases of objective economic
interests is no doubt of substantive impor-
tance to political theory in and of itself. The
discipline would, however, not progress very
far if the actual links between these mterests
and political attitudes and action remained
a mystery. In this particular case, the follow-
ing two questions are especially relevant. To
what extent, first of all, have anticipated
economic gains affected the likelihood that
the United States would engage in warfare?
How much, furthermore, have actually ex-
perienced economic effects influenced the
expansion or duration of military engage-
ment ? These are two logically distinct though
empirically related matters, and dealing with
either adequately would call for a research
endeavour of at least the same magnitude as
that already reported here. Nevertheless,
some preliminary suggestions should be use-
ful as they might, if taken in an appropriately
tentative light, put our findings in relevant
political perspective.
Economic interests and national war
involvement
It seems unlikely, both on the basis of exist-
ing documentary evidence and of extant em-
pirical research on the causes of war, that a
principal concern of those who have com-
mitted the United States to its recent wars
has been to jack up aggregate demand or, if
one prefers, to increase surplus absorption.
Nor can it be plausibly maintained that an
overriding impetus of warfare has originated
from a desire to increase labor’s share of
national income relative to that of capital.
Few political scientists would disagree and
no Keynesian nor sophisticated contempo-
rary Marxian has argued otherwise. In each
case, factors such as strategic concerns, per-
ceived international political interests, and
even ideological fervor appear to have
governed the decision to engage in open
warfare. The fact that such concerns often
seem misguided in retrospect does not de-
tract from their salience at the time when
the crucial decisions were taken.
The role of economic factors should not,
of course, be totally discarded. There is
indeed no reason to doubt that there was an
awareness of the likely economic consequen-
ces of war and this may have created a con-
text which made it easier to respond to other
concerns by engaging in active belligerence.
In other words, while not providing the
independent motive, the anticipation of such
consequences might have lessened resistance
to military involvement abroad. It is logically
not indifferent whether an impetus to action
is provided or whether resistance to action is
mitigated. From a practical viewpoint, how-
ever, the effects may often be equivalent.
The second question appears more open.
Once they were actually experienced, eco-
nomic effects may have influenced the ex-
pansion or duration of U.S. participation in
conflict there where it had already (for
whatever initial reasons) committed itself.19
There rarely is, as Joyce Kolko points out,
’an explicit decision to start a war to pull an
economy out of a recession. There is simply
an economic environment which encourages,
or does not discourage, an expansion of con-
fliCt.120 Thus, once a conflict reaches the
stage of active warfare, the level of national
economic performance may increase visibly
and certain redistributive effects may be felt;
these in turn may then influence the com-
mitment to further military involvement.
Here also, economic considerations should
not be made to carry an overly heavy ex-
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planatory burden. Even limited wars impose
very onerous costs on powerful nations and,
in the American case, this was reflected in
the general decline in public support for
military involvement as the wars progres-
sed.21 If, however, these costs could be con-
trolled for, one would expect economic
variables to play a discernible role - at
least to the extent of retarding the decline in
official resolve and in public support for the
venture.
In view of the emphasis of this study, it
would be useful to provide some suggestions
concerning the attitudes of both businessmen
and wage earners (as major parts of the con-
stituency to which policy makers must be
responsive) toward continued warfare. A
direct and simple link between their prefer-
ences and actual foreign policy outputs
would not be expected, yet an understanding
of the interests and desires of major social
groups is necessary to comprehend the
political context within which decisions to
expand or terminate conflicts are taken and
to which such decisions must be responsive.
We will begin with business, i. e., with
that sector of society which derives a sub-
stantial portion of its income from profits on
capital. On the basis of what has been said
so far, and assuming (as most social scien-
tists quite justifiably do) that relative posi-
tion is at least as important as absolute posi-
tion, one would expect to observe a declin-
ing enthusiasm for continued war involve-
ment as its effects on the distribution of
national income become evident. Most of the
available evidence would seem to support
this suggestion. Public opinion data, for ex-
ample, indicate that within the occupational
category described as ’professional and
business’ in March of 1966, only 28 % of
the respondents felt that the Vietnam war
was a mistake; by October 1969, however,
this figure had grown to 59 %.22
Attitudes of business toward war expan-
sion or continuation are also evident in the
movements of stock prices during wartime
and, here too, the evidence points in the
expected direction. A study conducted by
Hansen and Russett on the responses of the
stock market to escalatory and conciliatory
moves during the Vietnam War concluded
that, by the end of 1967, the American
financial community clearly desired a de-
escalation of the war.23 The fact that this
runs counter to much of the rhetoric of the
time makes it particularly interesting and,
by March of 1968, The Wall Street Journal
could claim with some justification that:
’One of the more impressive demonstrations
of antiwar feeling is underway these days in
about the last place that peace marchers
would look for it - Wall Street.’24 Such
was not the case from the outset of the war.
In mid-1965, with the first major commit-
ment of combat troops to Vietnam, the
Dow-Jones industrial average rose from a
moderately high level of 861 in late July
1965, to a historic high of 995.15 on Feb-
ruary 9 1966, as the war seemed to be pro-
viding a boost to the economy in the eyes of
many investors. Yet, within a relatively
short time, escalatory moves were followed
by dips in the market (and vice-versa). In
many ways, of course, business fared better
during Vietnam than during either World
War II or the Korean War, since neither
price controls nor excess profits taxes were
imposed. Nevertheless, labor costs did rise
with tight labor markets, creating infla-
tionary pressures and squeezing profits as
the war progressed. By 1968, for example,
the business press tended to complain that
the inflationary spiral was due to increases
in average rates of employee compensation
which were far in excess of productivity
growth, and that this escalating wage bill
could not be offset by corresponding price
boosts (presumably because of a fear of
provoking the introduction of price con-
trols). 25
Altogether (and on the basis of an ad-
mittedly limited evidential base), there is
reason to believe that while businessmen
might not be entirely averse to a short and
limited war, they do not view prolongued
military involvement as being in their best
interests. While this may be incongruent with
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many extant beliefs, it is interesting to note
that even as radical an author as Yoyce
Kolko should suggest that the decision to
halt the escalation of the Vietnam War was
due to the concerted pressure of American
corporate businessmen.26
What about labor? A preliminary distinc-
tion ought, in the first place, to be made be-
tween wage earners as individuals and the
organized unions which are meant to re-
present their interests in the political arena.
No real evidence of which this author is
aware suggests that the former are more
hawkish than businessmen in their attitudes
toward the nation’s limited wars .27 Further-
more, public opinion surveys on the Vietnam
War indicate that both blue collar and white
collar workers withdrew their support at a
rate which was comparable to that of
businessmen. According to the Gallup Or-
ganization, in March 1966 only 22 % of the
respondents identified as ’manual workers’
and 25 % qualified as ’white collar’ be-
lieved that sending troops to Vietnam had
been a mistake; by October of 1969 this
percentage rose to 56 % for both groups.28
It is, on the other hand, rather well known
that the support of organized labor never
flagged.29 While, given the supportive gen-
eral mood, one would have expected such
attitudes during World War II and the
Korean War, the extent of the backing pro-
vided by the unions for the Vietnam venture,
at a time when it came under powerful
domestic criticism, strongly suggests that
most of them realized where the interests of
their constituents lay. In fact, few major
American organizations provided the ad-
ministration with as stalwart an endorsement
on Vietnam as did the A.F.L. - C.LO. and,
with minor internal dissent,3° this support
lasted from the initial commitment until ulti-
mate withdrawal. While isolated quotations
should certainly be taken with a pinch of
salt, a statement by the president of Com-
munication Workers of America on the oc-
casion of President Nixon’s invasion of
Cambodia is too revealing in its bluntness to
be relegated to the obscurity of a footnote:
Suppose last night, instead of escalating into
Cambodia, President Nixon (had) said we are
pulling every man out in the quickest manner -
This morning, the Pentagon would have notified
thousands of corporations and said ’your contract
is cancelled’ - by tomorrow millions would be
laid off.31
What can we conclude about the attitudes
toward foreign military involvement? While
the empirical basis used here has admittedly
been impressionistic, three tentative infer-
ences are indicated. In the first place, faced
with eroding rates of profit, due in part to
rising labor costs, and with actual or feared
governmental regulation, business is not
likely to support a lengthy war. Organized
labor, on the other hand, tends to be a
reliable backer of military intervention -
presumably because of its effects on wages,
employment, and the redistribution of na-
tional income from capital to labor. Finally,
the individual wage earner appears less
likely to possess attitudes which are pre-
dictable on the basis of simple economic
considerations.
Concluding remarks
Despite the apparent benefits accruing to
wage earners, i. e., the bulk of the American
public, the progressive decline in support for
warfare has been noteworthy.32 Nonetheless,
had somewhat different circumstances pre-
vailed, economic concerns might have been
more decisive. Neither Korea nor Vietnam
came on the heels of a major recession, and
even World War II occurred after the nation
had emerged from the trough of the Great
Depression. Had they immediately followed
such periods, inflationary pressures might
not have threatened businessmen and in-
creased military production would have
provided an even greater blessing as far as
employment levels were concerned. There is
yet another reason why the vectors of pre-
vailing economic interests did not, as might
have been expected, decisively favor con-
tinued military involvement. It has been
pointed out that there was, in most cases, a
realization that military spending would not
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drop back to pre-war levels after the ter-
mination of hostilities. As Hansen and Rus-
sett maintain, high levels of peacetime mil-
itary spending and the contracts involved
may represent, for the businessman, a more
practical and less risky alternative to actual
warfare.33 In the case of Vietnam, this
suggestion is further buttressed by the fact
that, during the final phases of the war, the
financial press tended to invoke the prospect
of continued high levels of defense spending
and the development of new strategic
systems to discount the risk of a post-war
recession.34 There was thus little to lose and
something to gain if belligerence were ended.
In fact, as far as peacetime military outlays
are concerned, there may be no discrepancy
between the interests of capital owners and
wage earners. Organized labor has, indeed,
been as resolute a supporter of peacetime
defense spending at it has been of actual mil-
itary involvements - a support which has
ranged from general clamors for military
preparedness to the endorsement of specific
weapons systems.35
The conclusion is therefore that, under
somewhat different conditions (a preceding
recession or no prospects of massive defense
outlays after the war), economic concerns
may have had an even weightier effect on
military involvement abroad. Nonetheless, it
should be stressed that in the absence of
absolute and relative material gains for some
major social categories, decisions to engage
in hostilities (for whatever initial reason)
may have been harder to take in the first
place and the scope and duration of wars
may have been lesser.
A final, and perhaps unnecessary, word
of caution. In no case has the research
presented here been as exhaustive, nor the
methodology as sophisticated, as would
have been appropriate in a longer and more
ambitious study. The research does, how-
ever, point to certain well defined con-
clusions and these in turn seem to trace the
first contours of a coherent picture. Thus,
while the utility of this study is hopefully
more than just heuristic, considerably more
work will be needed for a comprehensive
and wholly compelling story to emerge.
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